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Savenda Management Services Limited v Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited & Gregory Chifire 
(Alleged Contemnor) (Appeal No. 37/2017) [2018] ZMSC 11 
Mwami  Kabwabwa1 
 
Facts  
The Supreme court of Zambia on 23 November 2018 delivered its judgment in what has been 
termed the longest contempt of court sentence in the history of Zambia.  This was the judgment 
in the case of Savenda Management Services Limited v Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited & 
Gregory Chifire (Alleged Contemnor). The judgment came as result of public criticisms and 
attacks against the Judiciary following the Supreme Court judgment in Savenda Management 
Services Limited v Stanbic Bank Zambia (hereinafter referred to as the Savenda judgment). The 
Savenda judgment witnessed an assortment of attacks from the media and individuals targeted 
at the judiciary particularly the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. One prominent 
individual behind the criticisms was anti-corruption activist, Gregory Chifire (the alleged 
contemnor). The attacks and criticisms alleged that the judgment passed was defective and that 
the judges assigned to the case received bribes from the Respondent in order to pass judgment 
in its favour resulting in a judgment obtained by corruption. Letters written by the alleged 
contemnor were addressed and delivered to the Chief Justice in her capacity as head of the 
judiciary requesting her to set aside the decision because it exhibited incompetence on the 




The Court held that the alleged contemnor was guilty of contempt of court owing to actions 
attributed to him which the Court found were intended to bring the reputation of the judiciary 
into disrepute and to ridicule the Court that delivered the judgment. The Court further held that 
the actions of the alleged contemnor were calculated at obstructing the administration of 
justice. The Court sentenced the contemnor to six years’ simple imprisonment.  
 
Significance 
Adjudicators have a social responsibility. When the Judiciary/judges carry out their 
constitutional mandate of dispensing justice it is critical to bear in mind that judges carry a 
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level of responsibility for the impact that their decisions have on society. For this reason, judges 
ought to be held responsible for every judgment they render either good or bad.  Contempt is 
an exceedingly powerful instrument in the hands of the courts to tame the conduct and 
behaviour of lawyers and lay people who come into contact with judicial authority. Like any 
other power, the exercise of contempt power has to be checked. The use of contempt power by 
the courts if unchecked risks violating or infringing upon the right of freedom of speech and 
free press. This in return has a deterring effect on the public’s freedom of speech and the 
vibrancy of advocacy for judicial accountability. The public and the press become fearful that 
any criticism altered against the judiciary or its judicial decisions coupled with any lapses in 
judicial decorum will result in personal liability for contempt of court. The lapses in judicial 
decorum flow from fervent advocacy for judicial accountability and also from the ordinary 
pursuit of freedom of expression. Consequently, the public and the press will have no choice 
but to either practice an indecisive brand of advocacy for judicial accountability or to operate 
under suppressed conditions of freedom of expression. Such a scenario is harmful to a 
democratic society. In writing this commentary, I take the position that any misplaced, 
uninformed, unjustified and personal attacks against judges or the judiciary’s judicial integrity 
in a broader sense regardless of its source is unacceptable and must not be entertained.   
 
Bearing in mind Article 118 of the Constitution which speaks to judicial authority and judicial 
independence it is important to acknowledge that authority and independence come with 
accountability. Therefore, judicial ways of attaining accountability ought to be balanced against 
their independence. The Court in this judgment provided a good and fair explanation of what 
the principles espoused in Article 118 of the Constitution entail. It rightfully acknowledged, 
though perhaps in a different way, that as part of accountability the judiciary and judges ought 
to be open to criticism that is constructive and that such criticism must be in good faith. If the 
judiciary is to remain independent and execute its constitutional mandate without undue 
influence it must shield itself from attacks and criticisms that are aimed at influencing the 
outcome of judgments. Unjustified criticisms and attacks devoid of evidence are unacceptable. 
The court stated that where there has been non-compliance with Article 118 the court system 
has appeal mechanisms. In the case of corruption allegations against judges or judicial officers 
this may be reported to the Judicial Complaints Commission, the Anti- Corruption Commission 
or other law enforcement agencies. 
 




The court took the liberty to explain and justify its inherent jurisdiction over contempt power 
to ensure that the administration of justice is not obstructed. Regrettably however, the trend in 
contemporary Zambian courts has been to consider any public comment over a matter before 
the court as potential contempt of court. Muna Ndulo a professor of Law at Cornell University 
posits that such a practice is entrenched in ancient interpretation of contempt of court under 
common law and that other common law jurisdictions globally have since rejected such an 
approach to the power of contempt of court. He argues that the global change of approach 
towards contempt of court power has largely been influenced by the growing respect of the 
importance of freedom of speech in democratic dispensations. Ndulo asserted that courts need 
to understand that the option of being respected is better than being feared.2 What can be 
gleaned from this in relation to contempt power as exercised by the Court in the Chifire 
contempt case is that the public or an individual’s disagreement with a decision of the court is 
not the equivalent of disrespect for judicial decisions. Furthermore, disrespect cannot be 
equated to obstruction of the administration of justice. Once these cardinal distinctions are 
ignored the risk of potential abuse of contempt power by the courts becomes high and contempt 
power becomes a warrant to discourage disagreement. It becomes a license to command respect 
and decorum as desired by the judiciary. The former Chief Justice of India Gajendragadkar 
gave admonition against the indiscriminate and frequent exercise of contempt power by the 
courts. The following was his observation:  
 
We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised 
cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or 
irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the court, but may sometimes affect it 
adversely. Wise judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to 
deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and 
objectivity of their approach, and by restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial 
conduct.3 
   
The main question that ought to have been addressed is what needs to be done to preserve 
judicial integrity, judicial independence and the audacious pursuit of administration of justice 
within the confines of Article 118 of the Constitution. In the circumstances of this case, the 
judiciary having taken note that the matter attracted wide public attention, having received 
letters from the contemnor and prior to service of the process upon the contemnor, the 
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Honourable Chief Justice as the head of the Judiciary bore the responsibility of coming out and 
addressing the public, speaking out in defence of the judges and the Judiciary. To make it clear 
to the public and the contemnor that firstly, that the judiciary does not shy away from 
addressing public criticisms of its decisions, and secondly, that the judiciary does not shy away 
from openly investigating and pursuing either wrongful or correct allegations of misconduct or 
corruption by individual judges. I take the position that had the judiciary, through the 
Honourable Chief Justice, taken the approach espoused above, the present case would have 
taken a different trajectory that would have earned the judiciary the respect and decorum they 
deserve. In taking this position, I am aware of the fact that the nature of judicial office is such 
that judges cannot respond to criticisms levelled against them particularly when they are 
baleful, personal and irresponsible. Thus the key question is how and what can be done to 
safeguard judicial integrity and bold quest for constitutional governance. Not far from us the 
South African Judiciary receives enormous criticisms over its decisions and over the conduct 
of individual judges.  The approach of the Chief Justice has been to address these allegations 
head on, to provide reasons and justifications for its decisions and to inform the public on the 
ways in which alleged misconduct of judges is being pursued within the judiciary, outlining 
the achievements that have been made.4 
 
The court in this case touched on the need for a balance between the competing needs of the 
judiciary to ensure effective administration of justice and preventing unwarranted interference 
with judicial business and those of the public to freely exercise their right of freedom of 
expression.  The court noted that in terms of the rules in the White Book, “the purpose of the 
power to punish for contempt is to prevent any attempt to interfere with the administration of 
justice”.5  The fundamental question here ought to have been what constitutes an interference 
or obstruction to the administration of justice. To do justice to this question one needs to 
scrutinize the nature of the judicial process at hand.  The present case was dealing with outside 
court speech/comment. With outside court speech, the power to punish for contempt maybe 
justifiably exercised only in circumstances where there is no reasonable doubt that the threat 
to the administration of justice is imminent.  On the other hand, when dealing with inside court 
speech or when faced with attempted interference with the outcome of a judgment before court, 
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it is justifiable to punish for contempt, reason being, justice is being affected through avenues 
other than those established for the proper administration of justice. 
 
In the American case of Bridges v California,6 the Supreme Court dealt with the right of 
expression in relation to contempt of court for outside court statements that were condemnatory 
of the conduct of judges. The court applied the “clear and present danger test” and established 
that on constitutional grounds, outside court publications suspect of contempt of court ought to 
be treated in a similar manner as other kinds of utterances that justify punishment only in 
circumstances were “the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of 
imminence must be extremely high before utterances can be punishable”.7 Although the 
Bridges case is only instructive, it can still be of assistance since our courts have not developed 
a test to be applied when dealing with contempt of court matters. Applying this test to the facts 
of the Chifire contempt case, I do not perceive that the actions attributed to the contemnor rise 
to the level of extreme seriousness and danger particularly to the administration of justice and 
impartial judicial process to justify the contempt convictions slapped on the alleged contemnor. 
In addition, if we apply the clear and present danger test broadly, the test may function as a 
constitutional limitation on the courts’ contempt power to ensure that the exercise of the 
contempt power is not abused.  
 
It is an acceptable position that institutions such as courts have high standards of decorum, are 
pedantic with their formalities and are particularly sensitive to any forms of court disruptions. 
However, it should never be acceptable that standards of contempt are dependent on the 
temperament of the judges presiding over the matter.  Furthermore, courts should ever bear in 
mind that where disrespectful publications or conduct targeted at the court is at play, it should 
not be not be regarded as a blatant harm worthy of the punishment of contempt of court except 
if it is so acute or it takes place in conditions that are delicate as to threaten the administration 
of justice. In its assessment of the extent to which the alleged contemnors actions were likely 
to interfere with the administration of justice, the court should have measured the possible 
obstruction objectively rather than subjectively. An objective test would not only focus on the 
actual interference or obstruction derived from the act suspected of contempt but rather the 
“character of the act done and its direct tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of 
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judicial duty”.8  Furthermore, whether an alleged contemnor’s actions can be considered to be 
contemptuous and an attempt to obstruct the administration of justice is not necessarily based 
on the influence the act has on the subjective mind of a judge, but is the “reasonable tendency 
of the acts done to influence or bring about the baleful results, without reference to the 
consideration of how far they may have been without influence in a particular case”.9  
 
Adopting objective standards of assessing allegations of contempt alleviates the possibility of 
exaggerated perceptions of decorum, respect and civility expected of people who come into 
contact with judicial authority or individuals who are generally exercising their right to freedom 
of expression. Subjective attitudes towards contempt power may lead to authoritarian 
limitations not only on the freedom of expression but also on the public’s ability to hold the 
judiciary accountable. The inescapable links between advocacy for judicial accountability, 
freedom of expression and contempt power cannot be ignored. It is therefore imperative that 
our courts develop a progressive jurisprudence that is appropriate for maintaining judicial 
integrity and respect while still faithful to constitutional values and principles. The Court noted 
in its judgment that individual rights to exercise freedoms such as freedom of speech and free 
press are superseded by the rights of the majority. While this statement is correct to some 
degree, it is important to think about this from a broader perspective which is that in different 
jurisdictions it is a widely accepted view that judicial business and its adjudicatory duties is a 
matter of public concern not just for the actual litigating parties. This explains why we have 
open court hearings. The purpose of this transparency is twofold: firstly, to ensure that the 
public knows what is happening, secondly, and most importantly, is so that the public is able 
to applaud, criticise and challenge the court’s conduct. In the South African case of State v 
Russel Mamabolo10 the Constitutional Court observed that “ultimately, such free and frank 
debate about judicial proceedings serves more than one vital public purpose. Self-evidently 
such informed and vocal public scrutiny promotes impartiality, accessibility and effectiveness, 
three of the important aspirational attributes prescribed for the judiciary by the 
Constitutions”.11 When dealing with actions suspect of contempt our courts would do well to 
take head to the admonition of retired South African Constitutional Court Judge Albbie Sachs, 
who once stated that “indeed, bruising criticism could in many circumstances lead to 
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improvement in the administration of justice. Conversely, the chilling effect of fear of 
prosecution for criticizing the courts might be conducive to its deterioration”.12 
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